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To study about a fusion power reactor for 
the helical type, conceptual design activities 
have been continued for a current-less fusion 
reactor such as a force free helical reactor 
(FFHR). Its main safety features are, 
(1) steady state operation with a small fraction 
of recirculating power, 
(2) plasma operating with no dangerous 
current disruption, 
(3) naturally installed divertor, and 
(4) force free configuration of helical coil 
which allow to supply the coil supporting 
structure or to use high magnetic field instead 
of high plasma f3. 
As a tritium breeding blanket system, 
molten salt (Flibe) type is selected from the 
view point of safety, such as low tritium 
inventory and self cooling effect. But safety 
analysis has not been made sufficiently 
because conceptual plant design is under 
studying. Recently safety analytical studies 
have been started to propose safety concept 
and to analyze abnormal events concerned at 
the FFHR. Fundamental safety consideration 
is made with the multiple protection system 
4th confinement 
3rd confinement 
and the concept of as low as reasonably 
achievable, known as ALARA, for radiation. 
Although the FFHR has many safety 
advantages, there is a possibility to occur 
abnormal events accompanied with the release 
of large energy. When the accident occurred 
with release of large internal energy, it gives 
damage to reactor structural components. The 
degree of damage depends on involved 
energies of accelerated ions and electrons, 
plasma heating, nuclear fusion, and magnetic 
field. 
As abnormal event sequences, it is 
considered to be loss of cooling capacity, loss 
of coolant or loss of vacuum in a vacuum 
vessel or in a cryostat containing a super-
conducting magnet. Loss of cooling function 
may cause severe damage to plasma facing 
com1ponents by high load of heat flux or 
neutron flux. Then following classifications 
related to safety issues and tritium boundary 
concept are proposed. 
(1) classification of plant system and 
components based on the safety requirement, 
(2) definition of vacuum boundaries, and 
tritium boundaries, 
(3) proposal of boundary protection systems. 
Representative radiological accidents caused 
by loss of plasma control or break of in-
vessel and/or out-vessel components were 
concerned. At the same time, some safety 
systems and counter measurements were 
discussed. Considering the tritium release in 
normal operation and in accident for FFHR, 
tritium boundaries are classified in two robust 
ones and two weak ones as shown in Fig 1. 
EVT: Expansion Volume Tank 
TRS: Tritium Recovery System 
GPS: Gas Purification system 
HePS:Hellum Purification System 
EGS: Exhaust Gas treatment System 
ACS: Air Cleanup System 
Fig. 1 Exhaust gas processing flow from 
various tritium confinement systems. 
The 1st and 2nd confinement systems are 
robust and operated in normal state, and 
the 3rd and 4th systems are in fault. 
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